Seas Of Security: A Strategic Blueprint For Countering The Houthi Threat

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Seas Of Security: A Strategic Blueprint For Countering The Houthi Threat

In order to stop the Houthis from further disrupting international marine traffic in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the Biden administration has mostly relied on bombings. However, as we’ve previously seen, this strategy is unlikely to succeed against an armed force that has withstood years of these isolated assaults from above. A comprehensive and fully-resourced maritime interdiction system is required to target the Houthis‘ supply lines and prevent them from using any kind of Iranian aid in order to significantly weaken their military capability.

Understanding the Houthi Threat at Sea

The Houthis’ violence solidifies their political hold on northern Yemen, despite their claims that their strikes are a reaction to Israel’s battle against Hamas in Gaza. It also aligns with Iran’s aspirations to become the dominant force in the region. Therefore, those assaults are probably going to happen no matter what happens in Gaza; after all, they were happening before the new regional war was sparked by Hamas’s strikes albeit less often. Freedom of navigation and free flow of business are at peril for the first time in forty years, undermining a fundamental US interest in the area that has served as the cornerstone of US Middle East strategy for successive American presidents. Iran, as it did in the Gulf in the late 1980s, is severely harming commercial activity in one of the most important waterways in the world by allowing the Houthis in Yemen to attack foreign vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden with armed drones and advanced anti-ship missiles, or in one notable case, hijack an entire vessel.

Assessing the Risks and Implications

The Houthi bombings have completely disrupted international trade and made many ships steer clear of Egypt’s Suez Canal, which is an essential conduit for freight and energy moving from the Middle East and Asia to Europe. Although the United States is not as affected by the oil market as Europe and other economically weaker countries are, if the Houthi attacks cause a significant disruption in supply, there could be significant risks to oil flows and a sharp increase in prices that would impact the US economy and reignite inflationary pressures. Without a doubt, the US has worked to neutralize the dangers. As the US Fifth Fleet noted in March 2023, the US has interdicted several ships that are carrying weapons for the Houthis; but, these attempts are more sporadic and lack enough funding. Something more unified is needed.

Crafting a Multifaceted Response

President Biden should assign US Central Command (CENTCOM) the responsibility of spearheading an interagency operation to prevent the Houthis from obtaining the tools necessary to disrupt unrestricted trade in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, thereby neutralizing the Houthi threat. In order to prevent the Houthis from being able to resupply or rearm themselves with weapons and weaponry components that they can use to attack foreign vessels, this effort should include preventing Iran from providing the Houthis with training, intelligence, targeting data, or other tools that could be used to impede the unhindered flow of trade. More funds for Task Force 59 unmanned surveillance vessels should be granted to the US Navy, even if only temporarily, in order to improve the current operation, which now continuously monitors more than 10,000 square miles of ocean. Once more, resources from other parts of the world might need to be sourced; although this is not ideal, the area has to be secured immediately and should take priority over other tasks. Biden has the authority and ought to direct some non-material moves. Operation Prosperity Guardian is a crucial first step in enlisting the aid of global partners and allies. However, in order to carry out the aforementioned interdiction operation at sea, a separate multinational task force needs to be established. The US Naval Forces Central Command Headquarters and the Combined Maritime Forces already have the same command organization.

Conclusion

In conclusion, The US Air Force squadrons (along with tanks), fusion cells, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as the ships, aircraft, and other task-specific units needed to accomplish the aforementioned goals, must all be provided to a broad-based interdiction regime. The Pentagon is pushing for “Great Power Competition,” but the realities in the Gulf need to take precedence over posturing for a Chinese battle that is, hopefully, long off. This will probably involve withdrawing planes from the Indo-Pacific.

Research Staff

Research Staff

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