A deadline for the US, the EU, and particularly Venezuela is approaching on April 18. The US will have to choose on that day whether to “snap back” the economic sanctions that it had lifted on October 18, 2023. The EU will determine simultaneously whether to keep personal sanctions against officials of the Venezuelan regime in place. The administration of President Nicolás Maduro ultimately decides how to proceed with international sanctions on Venezuela. In exchange for a lifting of some US sanctions, it promised to hold inclusive and competitive elections in 2024 during a conference held in Barbados on October 17, 2023. Not good news as the nation prepares for the elections on July 28.
Election deception in Venezuela
The idea behind the prospect of prolonging or reimposing sanctions was to coerce the Maduro government to follow through on its obligations. However, since October, the Maduro administration has detained opposition leaders, unilaterally barred the front-runner from contesting, and created a convoluted election schedule that is biased in favor of the incumbent. Most recently, the government issued arrest warrants for seven additional members of opposition leader Maria Corina Machado’s campaign team and detained two of the team’s leaders, Dignora Hernández and Henry Alviarez, on baseless allegations of conspiratorial behavior. This comes after Emill Brandt Ulloa and other network leaders connected to Machado were apprehended in an earlier wave of arrests. Whether the new round of persecution has broken the letter of the Barbados accord is debatable. However, they clearly go against its essence. The US is now in a difficult situation. The Trump administration’s maximum pressure approach failed to compel improvements in human rights or precipitate the fall of the Maduro regime for nearly five years. It was hoped that the prospect of losing a fresh source of income, international recognition, and the freedom of travel for officials under suspension would encourage Venezuela to lessen state brutality.
Accountability for Maduro’s regime
Through the Barbados deal, President Biden lifted US sanctions, permitting a limited amount of investment in Venezuela’s vital gas and oil industry. Giving the international community some clout was the aim of this. The EU’s choice to time the renewal of its own personal sanctions to coincide with the US sanctions review date of April 18 was also a wise one. It was hoped that the prospect of losing international recognition, a fresh source of income, and the freedom of movement for sanctioned officials would encourage the government of Venezuela to lessen state repression and maybe even hold a legitimately free and fair presidential election in 2024. In response, a number of businesses, including Shell, Repsol, and Maurel et Prom, hurried to invest in Venezuela. Government revenue rose along with oil production and exports; in 2023 alone, oil revenues are predicted to soar from $12 billion to $20 billion. The lifting of the sanctions undoubtedly aided in the nation’s efforts to choose a date for the 2024 presidential election. However, it had little effect on the Maduro government’s way of doing things.
Consequences for Venezuela’s dictator
Since October, the Maduro administration has repressed critics and violated human rights with little hesitation or even regret. After being arrested in the middle of February, activist Rocio San Miguel’s whereabouts are still a mystery. The schedule for the 2024 elections was eventually revealed by the electoral council of the Maduro regime in the beginning of March. The shortened schedule, however, only gives the electoral council four days (March 21–25) to register new or displaced voters; there are an estimated 5 million of them in Venezuela alone or prospective presidential candidates. In the meanwhile, the election scheduled for July 28th gives foreign election observation teams from the Carter Center and the European Union little time to travel and get ready in order to keep an eye on pre-election conditions as well as election-day processes and outcomes.
US leadership needed in crisis
In addition, the Maduro administration promised to establish a legal mechanism for reassessing the disqualification of three opposition contenders. Citing unproven allegations of corruption, the Maduro-filled Supreme Court issued a vacuous ruling in January maintaining the ban on Machado holding public office. In a liberal sense, it was modest compliance with the Barbados agreement, which did not mandate Machado’s reinstatement but rather the necessity of a legal procedure. However, the Supreme Court’s ruling smacks of a kangaroo court because it was made without a hearing or even the presenting of evidence. A schedule for elections, freedom of association, and other commitments have all been severely undermined. When considered separately, the arrest of Machado’s associates and the documented intimidation of public officials at protests by the opposition do not contravene Barbados’ norms. However, taken together, they amount to a betrayal of the promises made by Maduro’s administration.
